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MAINE’S EMBARGO FORTS
1
BY JOSHUA M. SMITH
The Embargo acts, passed in 1806-1808 during the Jefferson administra-
tion, were originally designed to punish Great Britain for violating
American neutrality on the high seas during the Napoleonic wars. In-
creasingly, however, the acts were enforced against Americans seeking to
defy the embargo and trade with England. Since Maine was heavily
committed to trading with Great Britain — and with its colonies imme-
diately to the north of Maine — the War Department ordered several
forts built along the District’s coast, ostensively to protect American citi-
zens from British reprisal or war, but in fact, to enforce the embargoes.
The forts brought sharply divided feelings in Maine. Joshua Smith is as-
sistant professor of history at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy and a
specialist in maritime history, naval history, New England history, and
Canadian-American relations. He received his M.S. in maritime history
and underwater archaeology from East Carolina University, an A.S.
from Maine Maritime Academy, an M.A. from the University of St. An-
drews in Scotland, in his Ph.D from the University of Maine. He pub-
lished Borderland Smuggling: Illicit Trade and the Formation of the
U.S.-Canadian Border, 1783-1820 in 2005, and has published several
articles in maritime and naval history and a two-volume edited series of
documents in American Maritime History.
BY THE SUMMER of 1808 the United States Congress had passeda number of embargo acts aimed at minimizing civilian tradewith Great Britain. This legislation was to be supported with
force, and given the unpopularity of these acts in New England, the en-
forcement provisions generated a great deal of heated discussion in the
press. A newspaper editor for the Alexandra Gazette questioned Presi-
dent Thomas Jefferson’s use of military power against civilians. While
writing in general terms, he was clearly describing the situation in East-
port in the District of Maine:
“Come with me, sir, to yonder eminence that overlooks the union —
cast your eyes eastward — do you see that vessel — that battery —
those armed men — it is the Wasp sloop of war — he is stationed there
in conjunction with the soldiers — for what? To attack our enemies?
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No such thing. All the energies of Mr. Jefferson are exhausted against
our citizens. These warlike preparations are intended to prevent our
merchants from selling their produce to those who would purchase.”2
According to the editor, President Jefferson was using the United
States military to impose by force of arms an unpopular law on the citi-
zens of a free republic. It is also representative of an idea that many
Mainers shared in this period: the federal government’s construction of
the second-system fortifications along the coast was intended not to
protect them from a British naval attack, but rather to awe the coastal
populace. To many citizens these batteries and fortifications were “em-
bargo forts,” designed more to keep American ships in than to keep for-
eign enemies out.
Understanding the purposes these posts served requires an explo-
ration of the Embargo’s impact on Maine communities. The federal at-
tempt to halt shipping to belligerent European nations was devastating
for coastal Maine, as it was for most coastal states.3 The economic im-
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Fort Preble in Casco Bay, along with other installations dotting the coast, was
built in the early nineteenth century to enforce the trade embargo against Great
Britain. These “embargo forts” were symbols of partisan division in the early Re-
public. Federalists consistently opposed the embargo, protesting and sometimes
actively resisting its enforcement. The embargo was a prelude to the War of
1812. Illustration provided by the author.
 
pact is well known, with grass growing on piers and vessels moored and
inactive. Less understood is the social and political unrest associated
with the Embargo. Riots, kidnappings, hard words, gunplay (including
one murder), jailbreaks, tarring and feathering, and of course rampant
smuggling afflicted the District.4 The Federalists made political hay of
the situation, and did their best to embarrass Republican efforts to sup-
port the embargo. On a visit to his Maine home, Secretary of War Henry
Dearborn noted that it was evident that Federalists encouraged Em-
bargo violations and endeavored to excite “general uneasiness in the
public mind and a dissatisfaction to insurrection.”5
Prior to the Embargo, Maine had exactly one federal fortification,
Fort Sumner in Portland. This installation was comprised of fewer than
a dozen soldiers and a handful of deactivated gunboats. By the end of
the Embargo, federal garrisons occupied forts at Eastport, Edgecomb,
the mouth of the Kennebec River, three different sites in Portland, and
Fort McClary in Kittery. Furthermore, the Navy had two gunboats at
Eastport, and one at Portland along with the USS Wasp, which spent the
winter of 1808-1809 at Portland. These units were not there to repel a
foreign invader; they were there to enforce an unpopular federal law. To
many Mainers there was a direct link between the increased number of
fortifications and the Embargo.
Parsing purpose, perception and utility of these coastal forts is not an
easy task, but by digging deep into primary sources a pattern emerges
that supports the idea of coastal batteries as “embargo forts.” It cannot
be found in the official reasons given for constructing these fortifica-
tions or in early nineteenth-century military theory. But public percep-
tion in the form of editorials, demonstrations, and threats certainly indi-
cates hostility to these posts and their garrisons. Additionally, the ability
of these batteries even to enforce the embargo indicates that these posts
were meant to bottle up American shipping. Indeed, the first shots fired
in anger from several of these posts would not be at foreign invaders, but
at American citizens engaged in breaking the embargo. Purpose, percep-
tion and utility will thus form the three criteria for considering the va-
lidity of the derisive term “embargo fort” when applied to the second
system fortifications built along Maine’s coastline.
In June of 1807 the Chesapeake was seized by British authorities and
four of its sailors impressed; three were Americans and the other was a
British deserter. In response, The War Department built coastal fortifica-
tions to protect American harbors from the Royal Navy. Initially the plan
for Maine’s coast was to provide it with small batteries at the mouth of
rivers, each with two cannon on traveling carriages, supported by gun-
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boats.6 This would provide an inexpensive and highly mobile defense, in
keeping with Jeffersonian ideals that emphasized frugality and the main-
tenance of the smallest standing military force possible.7 Sometime in
the early months of 1808, the War Department shelved these plans in fa-
vor of fewer but larger fortifications armed with more cannon.
The batteries seem to have been built according to the principles laid
out in Louis De Tousard’s 1809 American Artillerist’s Companion. Tou-
sard envisioned a system of batteries armed with a few heavy cannon
that would, in conjunction with small naval gunboats, defend a harbor
against a direct naval attack and defend coasting vessels from enemy pri-
vateer and small boat attacks.8 De Tousard calculated that so enormous
were the advantages of a land battery over ship-mounted cannon that a
battery of four eighteen or twenty-four pounder cannon was capable of
defending against a one-hundred gun man o’ war.9
The fortifications built after 1807 were the most substantial effort
ever to defend Maine. In the spring of 1808, Henry Dearborn ordered
nine fortifications built along the coast, from Eastport to Kittery. He also
ordered that Fort Sumner in Portland be repaired. Most of these de-
fenses were mere gun batteries designed to combat incoming warships.
Unlike a true fort the landward side of most of these batteries consisted
only of a wooden palisade and perhaps a blockhouse. The idea was that
local militia would muster to support a federal garrison. In addition,
Maine’s coastal fortifications were intended to work with the support of
the Navy’s gunboat fleet, twenty-five of which were to be stationed from
Kittery to Eastport.10 Congressman William Widgery of Portland was an
enthusiastic supporter of gunboats. He predicted that even if enemy ves-
sels got past the harbor forts on a fair wind and tide, the shallow-draft
gunboats could pursue the enemy. With both systems in place, the con-
gressman confidently predicted that no enemy would dare enter Ameri-
can ports. Federalists, who generally supported the idea of a deep-water
navy, scoffed at both Widgery and the coast-hugging gunboats.11
Most Mainers, in common with the American public as a whole dur-
ing the early nineteenth century, did not view the military in a favorable
light.12 Regarding the new fortifications, Mainers found two issues par-
ticularly offensive: the partisan nature of their construction, and the po-
litical composition of the federal units recruited to occupy the posts.
Like most government construction projects, Maine’s second system
fortifications were pork-barrel politics. Secretary of War Henry Dear-
born channeled these construction projects to his political allies, and in
Portland, to his son, Henry Alexander Scammel Dearborn. Federalists
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knew well that these fortifications politically benefited Jeffersonians by
providing jobs and patronage during the economic hardships brought
on by the embargo. Indeed, advertisements for materials for the Port-
land fortifications appeared only in the Jeffersonian Eastern Argus. De-
mocrats unapologetically held partisan celebrations in the newly con-
structed Forts Preble and Scammel.13 Federalist frustration was
probably the reason why young Dearborn found himself the victim of
nocturnal tricks, such as when somebody stole his office sign one
night.14
In other communities partisan Federalist antipathy to the forts re-
sulted in acts of vandalism against the fortifications themselves. In Cas-
tine unknown parties pulled down brickwork and smashed windows at
the local battery when it was still under construction.15 For some Feder-
alists, a more subtle, and perhaps more satisfying, method of obstruc-
tionism was demanding the highest price possible for the real estate
upon which the forts stood. Moses Davis, a moderate Federalist who in-
creasingly opposed the Embargo, charged $3,000 for Fort Edgecomb’s
site. Such prices caused some grumbling on Dearborn’s part, but he paid
nonetheless.16
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In the early nineteenth century, ten forts and batteries were built along the
Maine coast to supplement Fort McClary in Casco Bay. The installations were
designed to enforce the trade embargo with Great Britain. These structures,
stretching from York to Passamaquoddy Bay, were contested symbols of na-
tional policy. Image provide by the author.
 
The regiments raised in the aftermath of the Chesapeake affair also re-
flected the political agenda of the Jefferson administration, which care-
fully vetted officers’ political credentials. Those like Captain Joseph
Chandler of the U.S. Light Artillery, the first commander of Fort Preble,
or Captain John Binney of the U.S. 4th Regiment of Infantry, the first
commander of Fort Edgecomb, were partisan Jeffersonians.17 As
demonstrated in Ted Crackel’s Mr. Jefferson’s Army, this was part of a
long-standing program by Jefferson and Dearborn to transform the
American military into a loyal Jeffersonian institution.18
The first test of the political loyalty of these units would be in enforc-
ing the embargo. Federalists, especially in New England, were quick to
point out the dangers of military enforcement of civil laws, and in news-
paper editorials and town meetings, they protested the increasingly dra-
conian measures taken to enforce the embargo. A town meeting in Bath
proclaimed “we see with dread and detestation, military preparations
making among us; armed men patrolling our streets,” Hallowell re-
garded enforcing the embargo “by the arm of the military instead of civil
power, as unwarranted by the letter or spirit of the constitution.”19 But
these protests should be put in context; these same towns were quite
happy to use the militia to suppress the agrarian backcountry protests
which also reached their peak in 1808-1809.20
Given the dislike of a standing army, the jealousy concerning military
contracts, and the fear that the military would be used to impose unpop-
ular laws, many Mainers moved to undermine the regular military es-
tablishment. Harassment was common, but generally was non-con-
frontational. One favored method was to encourage individual soldiers
to desert, and all these posts suffered from high rates of desertion.
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This line drawing is a profile of Fort Edgecomb on the Kennebec River. All of
the embargo forts, including Edgecomb, suffered high rates of desertion, which
further weakened this unpopular policy. Illustration provided by the author.
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Within days of the ceremony that opened Fort Preble, three soldiers de-
serted.21 Fort Sullivan at Eastport suffered an enormous desertion rate,
with much of its garrison decamping across the border into New
Brunswick despite the threat of flogging if caught doing so.22 The sol-
diers destined for Fort Edgecomb and the Kennebec battery began de-
serting on their march to those places.23 Commanding officers posted
reward offers in newspapers for the recovery of these soldiers, but seem
to have had little success. While on leave in Freeport a private was so
filled with stories that he would have to fight his friends and countrymen
in enforcing the embargo that he contrived to get dismissed from the
Army by chopping off part off his hand. His commanding officer, ob-
serving that he had merely sliced off the tips of his left-hand fingers, re-
fused to discharge him on the grounds that he could still perform his du-
ties with his right hand.24
The manner in which the federal government activated the Maine
forts lent even more credence to the appellation “embargo forts.” Even
before completion, the national government rushed troops to these posts
to enforce the hated Embargo Act. At Passamaquoddy the embargo was
often termed the “Flour War,” a reference to the most common form of
contraband smuggled.25 Almost as soon as Congress authorized the em-
bargo in late 1807, smugglers flocked to the border with shiploads of
flour, other provisions such as salt beef, and naval stores such as turpen-
In February 1815 the Treaty
of Ghent brought the War
of 1812 to a close ending
the long dispute over trade,
freedom of the seas, and
American independence.
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tine and tar. In the spring of 1808 it looked like the adventurers would
overwhelm the region’s federal customs officer. The official complained
that there were upwards of a hundred vessels in the harbor, that a mob
threatened to burn his house, and that unless troops arrived soon, he
would have to flee Eastport.26 The promised troops arrived in June on
board the USS Wasp, an artillery unit commanded by Captain Moses
Swett. He moved to squash resistance to the embargo, which he consid-
ered an act of rebellion, but his unit’s effectiveness was severely ham-
pered by desertion, much of it instigated by smugglers who bribed sen-
tries with liquor and cash. More than a dozen soldiers deserted by the
end of the month.27 In fact his sometimes harsh methods of disciplining
deserters seemed to have inspired a labor stoppage on the fort under
construction at Eastport.28
Even when confronted with the military, locals vigorously defended
themselves. Captain Swett joined with the federal customs collector to
confront a local merchant and suspected smuggler. The officers de-
manded the merchant place his goods under federal custody. Despite the
threats, the merchant knew that he had as yet violated no law and con-
fronted the federal officers: “Gentlemen, I am here on my own soil, in
defence of my own property, and—as you have seen fit to conduct—of
my personal honor. Heed me, then, when I say, as I now do, that no man,
be he who he may, touches a barrel of this flour except at the peril of his
life. I have said: now take care of yourselves.”29 While this is an uncor-
roborated anecdote, it touches on the difficulties of enforcing an em-
bargo in a nation where property rights were sacrosanct. According to
the story, the federal officers withdrew, perplexed by the smuggler’s self-
righteous determination and bluster. By the end of June, Eastport was an
armed camp; by July, Captain Swett considered it in a state of rebellion.
Musket fire occasionally broke out, although no casualties seem to have
occurred.30
Portland suffered its share of disorder as well. In late October, a dis-
guised and armed mob of perhaps two hundred men took over the
wharves, loaded two vessels with a cargo, and sailed them out of the har-
bor. There was little customs authorities could do about it, since Port-
land’s harbor forts were unmanned.31 As a result on October 31 Secre-
tary of War Henry Dearborn ordered a newly raised company of soldiers
to occupy Fort Preble, with instructions to afford the customs collector
all the aid possible to carry the embargo laws into effect.32 Dearborn also
ordered Fort Edgecomb, the Kennebec battery, and Fort McClary
manned at this time, even though they were not completed.
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Yet far from overawing the populace, the federal garrisons were often
intimidated by local residents, and failed to stop embargo-breaking
ships altogether. Fort Preble’s first commander seemed particularly pan-
icky. Captain Joseph Chandler feared that the “Enemies of our Country”
might try to run their vessels out of the harbor in defiance of the Em-
bargo, possibly seizing Fort Sumner to expedite their escape and turn its
cannon on the revenue boats and gunboats that might pursue them. He
believed a “combination” of merchants, shipmasters, and mates in Port-
land intended to take their ships to sea—and to seize both Fort Preble
and eight to ten of the Navy’s gunboats to force their way out. Chandler
asked that an armed naval ship visit the harbor to discourage this con-
spiracy.33 As a result, USS Wasp spent the winter of 1808-1809 in Port-
land harbor.34
Nor did the forts succeed in stopping embargo breakers. Some ships
made more spectacular exits. In January, 1809, the brig Mary Jane,
armed with cannon and reinforced with additional crew hired to defend
the vessel, escaped from the Kennebec after a running gun battle with
the local revenue cutter and an exchange of gunfire with the fort at the
mouth of the river. Happily for the crew of the Mary Jane, the fort’s guns
could not fire because the parapet had been built too high. Thus the gar-
rison only fired muskets at the brig as it sped past.35 In February 1809,
the ship Sally sailed illegally from Bath, and also ran past the fort at the
mouth of the Kennebec, which fired its cannon in vain at the escaping
vessel.36 If these batteries were truly “embargo forts” they were not im-
posing enough to prevent embargo breakers from making the attempt,
nor effective enough to actually stop outbound shipping from leaving
port in contravention of the law.
In the early months of 1809 the Embargo Act encountered increasing
resistance. President Jefferson, realizing its failure and wanting to leave
his successor with a clean slate, ended the embargo just before leaving
office. Maine port communities responded with sheer unbridled joy.
The commander of Fort Edgecomb recorded the celebrations at Wiscas-
set in March 1809, writing “This town is in an uproar ‘the Embargo is
off ’ is all the cry; the Presidents proclamation was received this
evening—every man, woman, boy, girl, horse, dog, cat, pig, hen, duck,
and all living things are rejoicing, huzza’ing guns firing Bells ringing
flags flying not a Wiscasset but what is merry—you cannot imagine any-
thing more noisy than this town—I expect that by 1 o’clock everything
that can swallow, will be how fairs ye jolly boys.” Later that night the offi-
cer observed: “I have now just returned from the grand Jollification, all
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Wiscasset are pretty drunk by this.”37 The embargo was finally over, and
Mainers struggled to put their lives together again.
In the District of Maine, second-system fortifications performed a
dual role that reflected the U.S. Army’s mission as both a constabulary
and defense force. This function was not restricted to Maine; there was
considerable furor in Boston when its fortifications were used to block-
ade that harbor.38 Throughout coastal New England there was a popular
perception that the federal government’s second-system fortifications
were too weak to keep the vaunted Royal Navy out, but were well placed
to keep American shipping in. This was never true in doctrinal or ideo-
logical terms, but in practice there is plenty of evidence to support the
idea that second-system fortifications served to both protect harbors
from foreign enemies and impose federal control over them.
As such, these coastal fortifications themselves became a matter of
controversy and discord. In fact some of the first shots fired from these
forts’ guns were not at the ships of a foreign navy, but at American citi-
zens who thought they had a right to engage in sea-borne commerce.
Far from standing as a symbol of American unity in the face of foreign
invasion, these fortifications divided Maine communities and became
centers of discord and antagonism. That role would become even more
divisive in the approaching War of 1812.39
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